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Abstract 
 
We investigate the role of pensions as an element of total executive compensation, 
and the relationship between pensions and performance-based compensation in 
executive pay. Using hand-collected data on FTSE 100 CEOs and senior executives 
from 2004−2011, we document that pensions function as a substitute to performance-
based compensation (primarily bonuses) in both cross-sectional and time-series 
settings. We also examine the effect of corporate governance characteristics on 
executive pensions. We find that corporate governance characteristics associated with 
stronger board monitoring play a constraining role on the magnitude of pensions. Our 
evidence of substitution effects between pensions and performance-based 
compensation is consistent with a managerial power view of executive compensation-
setting, and the use of pensions as a ‘stealth’ element of compensation. Our findings 
are robust to considering different types of pensions, product market competition, and 
cross-listing. Sub-period analysis shows that pensions decrease and substitution 
effects weaken following the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, we find no evidence 
that the use of compensation consultants with potential conflicts of interest is 
associated with higher pensions. Overall, our study contributes to a greater 
understanding of the role of pensions in executive compensation, and shows the 
importance of including pensions in analysis of executive compensation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the role of pensions, a frequently overlooked element of 
compensation, as part of the overall executive compensation package. Pension awards to 
executives have come under increased public scrutiny, in light of concerns following high 
profile corporate failures. Compensation disclosures from firms such as the Royal Bank 
of Scotland and BP highlight the economic significance of pensions, revealing total 
pension values of £16 million and £11 million for their CEOs, respectively, departing in 
the wake of disaster (Daily Telegraph, 2009a; The Independent, 2009).  
In practice, pensions are important to investors, corporate governance analysts, 
regulators, and firms. Compensation committees consider pensions as an important 
element of compensation (Weight, 2013), and executives are known to negotiate their 
pension benefits (Treasury Committee, 2009).1 Evidence also shows that investors are 
concerned with pensions as part of the larger debate on executive pay (Deloitte, 2004). 
Leading institutional investors in the UK, such as the Association of British Insurers 
(ABI), express concerns about sizeable pension awards to executives and the potential for 
pension payouts on termination to provide a mechanism of rewards for failure (PIRC, 
2010). Pensions to executives are also on the agenda of policy-makers; new executive 
compensation disclosure regulations require listed UK firms to include pensions in their 
calculation of total executive pay, effective from 2014.2  
We are motivated to examine pensions as relatively little is known about the role 
they play in executive compensation, despite their prevalence and economic magnitude. 
Much of prior research focuses on cash-based and equity compensation; few studies 
directly address the topic of executive pensions, and have done so mainly in the US 
setting (Bebchuk and Jackson, 2005; Cadman and Vincent, 2014; Edmans and Liu, 2011; 
Gerakos, 2010; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassell et al., 
                                                          
1
 We use the term ‘executive’ to refer to a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and other executives such as 
the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), who are members of the board of directors. UK firms typically have 
a unitary board composed both of executive and non-executive directors, commonly referred to in the 
US as ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ directors, respectively. Our primary focus in this paper is on executives; 
we consider non-executives only as a governance mechanism in our empirical analyses. 
2 
Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) (Amendment) Regulations 
2013, Schedule 8: Quoted Companies Directors’ Remuneration Report 
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2012). Omission of pensions from prior research suggests that not only has total 
compensation been consistently underestimated, but that incentive effects of 
compensation packages are more complex when including pension-related incentives.  
Academic literature offers competing views of the role of pensions in executive 
compensation. A growing stream of research examines the incentive effects of executive 
pensions and their relationship with equity holdings from an agency-based perspective, 
where pensions form debt-like incentives in optimal compensation contracts, and help to 
alleviate agency costs of debt vis-à-vis equity incentives to induce efforts (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Consistent with the ‘optimal contracting’ view, empirical evidence 
shows that higher executive pensions serve to reduce overly risky managerial actions 
from equity incentives (Cassell et al., 2012) and align executives’ interests with those of 
debtholders (Edmans and Liu, 2011; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). This line of research 
suggests that executive pensions, as inside debt, represent a form of efficient contracting. 
Other studies examine the relationship between pensions and total compensation with 
mixed findings (Cadman and Vincent, 2014; Gerakos, 2010). 
The lack of quality and transparent disclosures on executive pensions highlights 
their opacity, and contributes to our limited understanding of different types of pensions, 
across various corporate governance regimes. An alternative ‘managerial power’ view 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004a) suggests that executive compensation is subject to agency 
conflicts and is influenced by other factors such as executive power and discretion. The 
implication of this view is that pensions, due to their lack of visibility and complexity in 
valuation, provide a mechanism for executives to obscure and extract additional, largely 
performance-insensitive compensation, as they are ‘under the radar.’ Consequently, 
pensions may represent a form of stealth compensation to executives, particularly 
susceptible to managerial power influences.  
Overall, the role of pensions in total executive compensation is inconclusive, 
given the competing theoretical views and mixed empirical results. We extend this 
literature by examining executive pensions in an international setting where disclosure 
requirements and governance of pension arrangements differ from those in the US. 
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Several institutional features of the UK setting enable us to perform more powerful tests 
of the managerial power hypothesis. First, disclosures required by UK law and 
governance codes allow us to obtain a unique dataset of disclosed, audited and actuarially 
estimated executive pension values. Second, in the UK, executives, as well as other rank-
and-file employees, can transfer defined benefit pension entitlements out of employer-
sponsored pension plans and into private pension plans. Such transfer-out entitlements 
potentially mitigate the strength of inside debt incentives to reduce risk. Indeed, anecdotal 
evidence from media reports, practitioners, and financial advisors suggests that inside 
debt incentives provided by pensions can be and have been circumvented when there is 
concern over prospects of the pension fund, and the ability of its sponsoring firm to 
contribute towards future deficits (Daily Telegraph, 2009b). This is particularly relevant 
for executives, who have inside information on the firm’s ability and willingness to fulfill 
future pension obligations, effectively providing an option to withdraw their pension 
holdings before other claimholders. Third, UK pension legislation allows scheme 
members to withdraw 25% of their total accumulated value tax-free immediately on 
retirement, thus further reducing the strength of debt-based incentives.  
Using a sample of UK-listed FTSE 100 CEOs and senior executives during the 
2004–2011 period, we examine whether pensions function as substitutes or complements 
to performance-sensitive elements of the compensation package. In our cross-sectional 
analyses, we find evidence that pensions function as a substitute for performance-
sensitive compensation (primarily bonuses), and excess compensation, after controlling 
for the mechanical relationship between pension and salary. We are cautious to draw 
strong inferences about causality on this cross-sectional substitution effect, as it may 
reflect variations in firm characteristics or what is considered ‘optimal’ between firms.  
We therefore extend our analysis to examine the effect of corporate governance 
on executive pensions. Prior research finds that CEOs of firms with weaker governance 
receive higher compensation (Core et al., 1999). We find that stronger governance is 
associated with lower pensions and mitigates the substitution between pension and 
performance-sensitive pay. This result is consistent with Bebchuk and Fried (2004a)’s 
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managerial power hypothesis, where pensions can be used to extract rents and weaken 
pay-performance sensitivity, and is in line with expectations of weaker shareholder 
control over less transparent elements of compensation (Craighead et al., 2004). We then 
extend the analysis of executive pensions and performance-sensitive pay to a dynamic 
setting. We present evidence that, consistent with the managerial power hypothesis, 
decreases in bonuses are associated with increases in pensions, suggesting that pensions 
can also serve as dynamic compensation for bonus shortfalls, in a less visible way. 
The sample period of 2004 to 2011 further enables us to examine the impact of 
economic changes on executive pensions. Our main findings are robust to the sub-period 
prior to the 2008 financial crisis, and we find that the substitution between pension and 
excess compensation is significantly weakened following the crisis. The constraining role 
of corporate governance on pensions remains robust. Our results also hold after 
controlling for product market power and foreign exchange listing, tax considerations, 
and in separate analyses of different types of executive pension incentives. Additional 
tests on the role of compensation consultants reveal no relationship between potentially 
conflicted compensation consultants and higher executive pensions. 
Our paper makes several novel contributions to the emerging executive pension 
literature. First, we extend prior research by considering the relationship between 
pensions and performance-sensitive elements of pay, and investigating the dynamic 
relationship between changes in pensions and performance-based bonuses over time. We 
provide new empirical evidence of both cross-sectional and dynamic substitution effects 
between executive pensions and performance-sensitive types of compensation, during an 
extended sample period which encompasses the financial crisis. This complements prior 
US- and UK-based findings (Gerakos, 2010; Cadman and Vincent, 2014; Kabir and 
Minhat, 2009), and contributes to an enhanced understanding of the role of pensions in 
executive compensation. Considering the guaranteed nature of pensions, our findings 
suggest that prior compensation research has consistently underestimated the true 
proportion of compensation that is fixed, and overestimated the proportion that is at risk. 
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This may bias inferences about the composition of pay packages and the strength of pay-
performance sensitivity.  
Second, our study provides new evidence on the effect of corporate governance 
on executive pensions, showing that corporate governance plays a mitigating role on 
executive pensions. We contribute to an increased understanding of governance regimes 
and executive pension arrangements in the UK, a significant market of interest in 
compensation and governance research. Third, by covering both pre- and post-financial 
crisis periods, we provide evidence on the impact of the financial crisis and institutional 
changes on executive pension policy.  
Last, our study is one of the first to provide a deeper examination of institutional 
arrangements governing pensions in a non-US setting, and provides a comprehensive 
overview of executive pensions in the UK. We show that pension awards to UK 
executives are economically significant and have evolved into complex arrangements. 
Furthermore, the complexity of disclosures increases the difficulty for shareholders to 
fully discern, quantify and monitor pension awards. 
Section two synthesizes related literature and provides details on institutional 
arrangements governing executive pensions in the UK. Section three formulates the 
hypotheses. Section four discusses our data and research design. We present our results 
and extensions of our analysis in sections five and six, and discuss our findings and their 
policy implications in section seven.  
2. LITERATURE AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
(i) The role of pensions in executive compensation 
Traditional labour economics literature suggests that firms provide defined benefit 
pensions to their employees, including executives, for a number of reasons, including 
bonding them to the firm for the long term, mitigating shirking, and reducing incentives 
for risky behaviour, to ensure long-run firm survival. Pensions also reduce employee 
turnover, as employees have a vested interest in remaining at the firm until retirement age 
(Ippolito, 1991; Gustman et al., 1994). In the case of executives, we further observe 
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competitive labour market-related factors in the setting of pensions, where firms consider 
the competitiveness of their executive pension plan benefits. This suggests that firms 
view pensions as important to the total executive compensation package, and are 
conscious of similar provisions offered by competitors.  
Several recent empirical studies provide evidence showing that pensions 
constitute an economically significant proportion of executive compensation. Bebchuk 
and Jackson (2005) estimate that pension benefits paid to 51 US CEOs have a mean total 
actuarial value of $17.1 million. In a sample of 287 US CEOs, Cadman and Vincent 
(2014) find an average CEO pension plan value of $10.2 million. Sundaram and Yermack 
(2007) find that annual increases in pensions constitute approximately 10% of total 
compensation for a sample of 237 US CEOs. In our study, we observe that pension-
related compensation for executives is widespread in the UK, with 94% of FTSE 100 
executives receiving one or more forms of pension-related compensation during the 
2004−2011 period. These pension benefits are economically significant, comprising on 
average 13% of executive compensation and increasing fixed compensation by 72%. In 
spite of this importance, however, pensions remain relatively overlooked in the empirical 
compensation literature, as highlighted by Jenter and Frydman (2010) in their review of 
recent progress in compensation research.  
Agency theory offers competing views of incentive effects of pensions in 
executive compensation. Several recent empirical studies hypothesize that pensions 
provide efficient ‘optimal contracting’ incentives to align interests between executives 
and debtholders (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Cassell et. al., 2012), reducing the 
propensity for risky behavior, especially under the threat of bankruptcy (Edmans and Liu, 
2011). Sundaram and Yermack (2007) suggest that the payment structure of pension 
awards is similar to corporate debt contracts, and refer to them as inside debt. Similar to 
debt, a pension entitles the holder to a stream of pre-defined cash flows over a long period 
of time, which would also be at risk in case of corporate default. In a sample of large US 
firms, they find that CEOs with higher pension to equity ratios manage their firms more 
conservatively. Wei and Yermack (2011) show that US firms with high levels of inside 
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debt were more likely to experience increases in bond prices and decreases in share prices 
in response to SEC reforms to enhance disclosures of executive pension entitlements. 
Cascino and Veenman (2014) find that inside debt use is associated with more efficient 
contracting. The emerging ‘inside debt’ literature, however, has not provided insights into 
the role of corporate governance, and the relationship between pension and performance-
sensitive compensation.  
Another strand of research frames executive pensions as a mechanism of rent 
extraction (Bebchuck and Fried, 2004b; Bechuck and Jackson, 2005). Bebchuk and 
Jackson (2005) propose that pensions function as a mechanism of camouflage, or ‘stealth’ 
compensation, since non-existent or poor quality disclosures on executive pensions 
reduce the level of observable compensation. Such stealth compensation reduces potential 
criticism about over-compensation and non-performance-sensitive compensation, and 
provides a greater cushion from the potential ‘outrage’ level, which would generate 
unwanted attention. Cadman and Vincent (2014) find that CEO pensions are not 
performance-sensitive, while Kabir and Minhat (2009) find lower pay-performance 
sensitivity when including pensions in measures of total compensation, reducing the 
riskiness of overall compensation. Kalyta and Magnan (2008) provide empirical results 
broadly consistent with a rent extraction view, for a sample of Canadian firms. They find 
that the use and size of Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs) is positively 
related to CEO power, and that powerful CEOs are more likely to extract additional 
compensation that is largely independent of performance. Kabir and Minhat (2009), who 
to our knowledge provide the only other study of UK firms, find that CEO power is 
associated with higher pensions. 
A few recent studies examine the relationship between executive pensions and 
other types of compensation, with mixed findings. Gerakos (2010) finds that the use of 
executive pensions is negatively related to the rest of the compensation package. By 
contrast, Cadman and Vincent (2014) find that in a sample of US firms, pensions are 
complementary and positively associated with overall compensation. Prior research from 
pension economics suggests that there may be a tradeoff between salary and pensions. 
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Under competitive market conditions, workers of similar productivity and ability receive 
equal total compensation, but possess heterogeneous preferences for pay and benefits. 
Such equalizing theory predicts a dollar-for-dollar tradeoff between worker wages and 
benefits such as pensions. However, empirical studies in the economics literature 
typically find insignificant relationships for the wage-pension tradeoff, or mixed evidence 
(e.g. Gunderson, et al. 1992). Furthermore, it is unclear whether any relationships 
observed for rank-and-file employees would be applicable to executives, who are 
generally characterized by superior abilities, have greater bargaining power with boards, 
and earn higher compensation of all types. Overall, the competing views of pensions, as 
an optimal form of executive pay or as a mechanism of rent extraction, have not been 
fully reconciled. To extend this literature, we explore the relationship between pensions 
and performance-sensitive compensation, and the role of corporate governance in 
executive pension awards.  
(ii) Institutional arrangements in the UK 
Executive pensions in the UK are subject to significant variation. Executives are typically 
members of an approved occupational pension scheme, and a separate scheme is often 
provided for senior managers and executives. The key types of pension provisions offered 
to executives include (i) defined benefit pension, (ii) defined contribution pension, (iii) an 
explicit cash salary supplement in lieu of pension, or (iv) any combination of these three. 
Our data show that approximately 94% of FTSE 100 executives receive some form of 
pension-related compensation, indicating widespread prevalence.  
Executive pension plans are largely governed by the same legislation as other 
pension schemes; however benefits and entitlements may differ from those in 
occupational schemes for rank-and-file employees. Approved executive plans are 
regulated by the UK Pension Schemes Office, provided that contributions are within 
limits set by HMRC (the UK tax authority). UK legislation imposes maximum annual and 
lifetime limits on tax-deductible pension benefits under approved schemes. While these 
limits do not affect the vast majority of rank-and-file pension plan members, many 
executives exceed the limit, and firms may provide supplemental (unapproved) retirement 
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plans which are not tax-registered, to top up the approved, tax-deductible retirement 
benefits.3 Therefore, differences in magnitude and structure of executive pensions, and 
the level of inside information, mean that risks and incentives from executive pension 
packages are likely to differ from those of rank-and-file employees. 
Different types of pension compensation are subject to different types of risk. 
Future payouts of defined benefit pension plans depend on the financial strength of the 
pension fund and the sponsoring firm’s ability to fulfill any future pension fund deficits. 
Therefore, market-based risks of invested pension assets lie with the pension fund, except 
in the case of insolvency, where part of the investment risk is then shifted to the 
individual.4 In contrast, risks of defined contribution pensions are entirely borne by the 
individual, and salary supplements are risk-free. However, as we note in the introduction, 
UK executives’ exposure to risks from defined benefit pension plans can be managed or 
circumvented via the transfer of approved pension benefits out of the plan into a private 
defined contribution fund, which can then be invested at the individual’s chosen level of 
risk (including risk-free assets).5 While such transactions must be disclosed if they occur 
during an executive’s tenure, once he/she leaves the board, disclosure is no longer 
required, reducing long-term risk after leaving the firm. Supplemental unapproved 
benefits may be payable immediately on retirement, further reducing long-term risk. 
Despite the prevalence of pensions to executives, compensation research in the 
UK has largely focused on cash and equity-based compensation. Difficulty in obtaining 
data on executive pensions is likely related to the complex nature of pension 
arrangements and their disclosures. For example, the data source used by Voulgaris et al. 
(2010), Horton et al. (2012), and Ozkan et al. (2012) on UK executive pay includes only 
defined contribution pension data.  
                                                          
3
 Supplemental plans include Funded Unapproved Retirement Benefit Schemes (FURBS) and 
Unfunded Unapproved Retirement Benefit Schemes (UURBS), similar to SERPS, discussed by 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Kalyta and Magnan (2008) in the US and Canadian settings, 
respectively. We note that the proportion of benefits accrued under non-tax qualified (supplemental) 
schemes does not typically comprise the majority of executive pension benefits in the UK during our 
sample period.  
4
 Though a government defined benefit pension guarantee exists in the UK, most executives would be 
well over individual limits in case of insolvency, of approximately £31,000 per year as of April 2013. 
5
 See Appendix A for HSBC Holding’s disclosure of a transfer out case of defined benefit entitlements.  
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Regulations governing disclosure of executive pensions in the UK have evolved 
alongside corporate governance codes on compensation. Required disclosures on 
pensions to executives have steadily increased since the Cadbury Report (1992), and are 
governed during our sample period by the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 
(2002), the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003; 2006), and the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) Listing Rules. These regulations require listed firms to disclose 
various forms of pension-related compensation, the audited actuarial present value 
(transfer value) of the total accrued defined benefit pension at the end of each fiscal year, 
and related pension values for directors involved in a company pension plan.  
Consistent with findings from practitioners and regulators (Deloitte, 2004, BIS, 
2011), we observe significant variation in disclosure practices of UK firms. Pension 
disclosures require careful attention and expertise to comprehend, due to the complexity 
and variety of pension arrangements, many involving multiple pension components. 
Assessing their value, economic significance and incentive effects is further complicated 
by non-uniformity in disclosure location and presentation within remuneration reports. 
Different types of pension compensation are often tabulated or described in different 
sections of the same compensation report, and are often excluded from the primary 
compensation table, or described in dense narrative or footnotes. Such discrepancies in 
disclosure practices and opacity have likely contributed to pensions being overlooked by 
researchers and data providers, inadvertent omission of some pension components even 
when collecting data, and their perception as a mechanism of rent extraction. Regulators 
have noted that this variability in disclosure is problematic to users (BIS, 2011), and 
recent reforms of executive compensation disclosure in the UK require standardized 
pension disclosures from 2014 onwards. In contrast, US firms have followed a 
standardized SEC template for executive pension disclosures since 2006.  
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3. HYPOTHESES 
Our first hypothesis considers the role of executive pensions in total compensation from a 
traditional equilibrium perspective, with agency conflicts among shareholders and 
executives (see among others, Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979; Grossman 
and Hart, 1983). Executive compensation under ‘optimal contracting’ is structured to 
provide an efficient set of incentives through mechanisms such as performance-based 
bonuses, salary increases, stock options, and dismissal decisions, which induce the 
executive to make optimal decisions for the firm. Consequently, economic factors, rather 
than institutional factors, should be significant in explaining variations in the level of total 
observable compensation (e.g. Holmstrom, 1979). The unexplained part thus reflects the 
excess or deficiency in visible pay levels. Such an equilibrium compensation package 
from the views of both the executive and the firm would comprise all elements of 
compensation, including pensions, irrespective of disclosure requirements. If overall 
compensation reflects an equilibrium outcome, executives viewed as over-compensated 
(i.e. having an excess in total visible pay levels) would receive a lower pension, ceteris 
paribus. This leads to the prediction that, in equilibrium, pensions are higher in firms that 
offer lower total visible compensation. However, evidence of a systematic cross-sectional 
relationship between total visible compensation and pensions is not sufficient to 
discriminate between the ‘managerial power’ and ‘optimal contracting’ views of 
pensions. This is because, under equilibrium compensation setting, cross-sectional 
substitution between pension and visible pay may reflect variations attributable to firm 
characteristics or in what is considered ‘optimal’ between firms.  
Alternatively, the managerial power view is not constrained by the assumption 
that observed board and ownership structure induce optimal contracting, and predicts that 
powerful agents within organizations have the ability to extract additional rents, with an 
aim to maximize their own wealth (Hirshleifer, 1978; Bebchuck et al., 2002; Bebchuck 
and Fried, 2004a). Prior research shows that the disclosure environment influences the 
structure and performance-sensitivity of compensation (Craighead et al., 2004). Due to 
the lack of quality and transparent disclosure of executive pensions, the managerial power 
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view suggests that pensions function as a less visible element of compensation contracts, 
and may be more favourable than bonus or other performance-sensitive compensation, 
which are more easily monitored by shareholders. Though under economic theory, short-
term compensation is preferable to longer-term compensation, executives may agree ex-
ante to accept a reduction in short-term bonuses, because of the risks associated with 
underlying incentives. Equity-based incentives, furthermore, are also contingent on 
vesting conditions. In contrast, the certainty and vested rights associated with pensions 
may outweigh the costs of deferring the compensation to the longer-term. Pensions also 
provide a guaranteed post-retirement income stream, providing security for risk-averse 
executives. Moreover, executives may also agree ex post to accept smaller bonuses, 
resulting from poor performance, for public visibility or signaling reasons. In this case, 
accepting opaque and poorly-disclosed pension compensation may be preferable to 
criticism of “greed’ or unwarranted bonuses, which risk shareholder dissention. In the 
latter case, pensions provide a mechanism for managers to camouflage their total publicly 
visible pay, and reduce potential outrage costs (Bebchuck and Jackson, 2005). Therefore, 
other things being equal, executives face incentives to trade off performance-sensitive 
compensation for additional pension benefits.  
While it is possible in theory that executives could also trade off current period 
salary for future pension benefits (Gunderson, et al. 1992), executives face few incentives 
to reduce salary in practice, since it is typically the basis for determining other elements 
of compensation, including bonuses, equity, and pensions (Weight, 2013).6 We therefore 
predict cross-sectional negative relationships between pensions and performance-
sensitive compensation (bonuses and equity grants). We formulate our null hypotheses 
H1a and H1b as follows:  
 
H1a: The magnitude of pensions is negatively related to total visible compensation.  
H1b: The magnitude of pensions is negatively related to performance-sensitive compensation.  
                                                          
6
 Incentives faced by CEOs and senior executives are likely to be different from rank-and-file 
employees; it is widely observable they receive higher salaries, higher pensions, and higher total 
compensation than rank-and-file employees. 
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There are reasons to predict, however, that cross-sectional substitution between 
pension, excess compensation, and performance-sensitive compensation could be the 
outcome of unresolved agency problems. Kalyta and Magnan (2008) show that more 
powerful CEOs receive higher levels of non-tax qualified supplemental pensions, while 
Core et al. (1999) find that excess compensation is associated with poor corporate 
governance. To help discriminate between alternative theoretical predictions, we next 
explore the effect of corporate governance on pensions, focusing on board monitoring.7  
Regardless of the extent of managerial power, rent extraction is constrained by 
mechanisms of shareholder control, including corporate governance mechanisms. The 
managerial power theory suggests that powerful executives, combined with board 
conflicts of interest and weak monitoring, influence the compensation-setting process to 
obtain higher or more favourable compensation packages (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004a). 
Several studies lend support to this argument, for example, examining the role of 
corporate governance (Core et al., 1999), compensation consultants (Murphy and 
Sandino, 2010; Voulgaris et al., 2010), and opportunistic timing of option grants 
(Yermack, 1997), among others. The managerial power hypothesis predicts that as the 
CEO’s power over the board increases and as the board’s monitoring capabilities 
decrease, the CEO will be able to extract additional rents and the compensation package 
will shift in his favour. Therefore, we state the second hypothesis in alternative form: 
H2: Pensions are higher in less well-governed firms.  
In H1 our predictions of substitution between pension and performance-sensitive 
compensation focus largely on cross-sectional differences in firm-level compensation 
policies, which may result in an equilibrium level of total compensation when including 
pensions. Similarly, prior empirical research on executive pensions largely focuses on 
cross-sectional differences between firms. However, substitution may also occur over 
time. In particular, pensions can be used as a mechanism to offset decreases in visible 
                                                          
7
 We focus on governance quality primarily from a board monitoring perspective for institutional 
reasons, as it is more applicable in the UK setting than CEO power. Common measures of CEO power 
from prior research, such as CEO/Chairman duality and director interlocks, are not widely occurring in 
the UK, and therefore, focusing on monitoring variables is more appropriate in our setting. 
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elements of compensation, such as bonuses, during periods of poor performance. We 
therefore extend H1b to a dynamic setting, allowing for pensions to function as a substitute 
for performance-sensitive compensation over time. Such ‘dynamic’ substitution would 
reduce the likelihood of public outrage, and promote an impression of higher pay-
performance sensitivity via total visible pay (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004b). Consistent with 
a view of manager-influenced compensation, we therefore predict a dynamic substitution 
between bonuses and pensions. We make no predictions about a dynamic relationship 
with equity, which is a long-run instrument that has potential for growth or recovery in 
subsequent periods. The above discussion leads to the following ‘dynamic’ substitution 
hypothesis: 
H3: Decreases in bonuses are associated with increases in pension compensation. 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
(i) Sample and data 
Our sample is composed of all executives of UK firms in the FTSE 100 index each year 
from 2004 to 2011, excluding investment trusts and real estate trusts. We end our sample 
period in April 2011 in light of changes in HMRC regulations, which reduced the limit of 
tax-deductible pensions to £50,000 per annum from the 2011/2012 tax year onwards. This 
change may have led firms to re-evaluate their overall pension compensation policy 
(Weight, 2013), introducing bias into later analysis. 
We hand-collect pension data for each executive from annual reports, including 
(i) changes between beginning- and end-of-year actuarial present values of defined 
benefit pension entitlements (changes in the transfer value of the pension, net of 
inflation),8 (ii) the firm’s contributions to an executive’s defined contribution pension 
plan, and (iii) the total salary supplement paid to an executive, either to make his own 
pension arrangements, to supplement a defined benefit or defined contribution pension 
                                                          
8
 The actuarial present value of future defined pension benefits is calculated according to the number of 
years of service, expected average or final salary at retirement, using the prevailing benefit formula, 
using actuarial assumptions about life expectancy and market interest rates. These are calculated in 
accordance with the Actuarial Guidance Note GN11, published by the UK Institute of Actuaries and 
the Faculty of Actuaries. We note that the transfer value represents the amount that may be transferred 
to another pension plan, including defined contribution plans, and that benefits may be renegotiated.  
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which has already reached the HMRC tax limit, or to cover taxes arising from pension 
benefits above the HMRC tax limit.9 
Data on other elements of executive compensation, age, tenure, ownership, and 
board characteristics are obtained from BoardEx, and accounting and market data from 
Datastream. FTSE index membership and industry classification are obtained directly 
from FTSE. After excluding executives without a full year of service, and those with 
missing compensation or Datastream data, our sample consists of 585 firm-years and 
2,140 executive director-years. 
(ii) Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of firm-level characteristics for our sample firms. 
The median LogAssets corresponds to a firm with median total assets of £6.6 billion. Both 
operating performance, ROA, (10%) and market returns, Return, (16%) are on average 
positive over the sample period. The median BTM ratio is 0.23 and median firm Leverage 
is 19%. Untabulated correlation matrices show some modest correlation between our 
regression variables. However these correlated variables are used in different model 
specifications, with the exception of BTM and Leverage, which we include as controls.  
--------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
---------------------------------- 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of executive compensation for all CEOs and non-
CEO executives in our sample. For brevity, we pool CEO and non-CEO data, but 
untabulated descriptives show that CEOs earn significantly more than their non-CEO 
counterparts. Executives receive an average pension award of £352,000, or 72% of 
Salary. The mean CEO pension (£519,000, untabulated) is comparable to that found by 
Kabir and Minhat (2009), who find an average UK CEO pension of £300,000 during the 
period 2003−2006. Pensions constitute a significant fraction (13%) of total compensation 
                                                          
9
 Appendix A provides an example of a multi-element pension arrangement, with the executive C.R. 
Hyman of Serco plc accruing defined benefit pension entitlements with a transfer value, net of 
inflation, of £17,549, defined contribution payments of £10,815, and additional salary supplements of 
£98,406, for a total pension-related compensation of £126,770, or approximately 18% of his total 
compensation (excluding pension).  
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including pension, comparable to the mean annual pension as a percentage of pay found 
in prior US studies (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Gerakos, 2010).  
--------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
---------------------------------- 
Table 3 presents a distribution of pension plan types for all executives in our 
sample. These include three key types of pension provision: (i) defined benefit pension, 
(ii) defined contribution pension, (iii) salary supplement, all combinations and 
permutations, and no pension-related compensation. We observe considerable 
heterogeneity in executive pension arrangements, and note that defined benefit plans are 
the dominant form of pension for executives in FTSE 100 companies. However, the data 
show a gradual move away from defined benefit only plans, in possible response to 
changes in the UK’s pension taxation regime in April 2006, the 2008 financial crisis, and 
in anticipation of further regulatory changes in April 2011.  
---------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
--------------------------------- 
(iii) Cross-sectional analysis of pensions and other elements of compensation 
We first test H1a by examining whether pensions form part of an equilibrium 
compensation package and whether excess compensation is associated with higher or 
lower pensions. We first estimate under- or over-compensation as the residual from a 
model regressing Log(Total pay) (excluding pensions) on economic determinants. 
Consistent with prior research, our total compensation model includes a comprehensive 
set of firm-level controls (Core et al., 1999; Murphy, 1999; Jenter & Frydman, 2010), 
tenure of the executive on the board of directors (Tenure), and the executive’s ownership 
(%Ownership) in the firm (Hill and Phan, 1991; Cyert et al., 2002). We include age group, 
year, and industry controls. Following Core et al. (2008), we measure Residual pay as the 
difference between observed Total pay (excluding pensions) and Predicted total pay, 
where Predicted total pay is the exponentiated fitted regression value. It is important in 
our research design to control for the mechanical positive relationship between salary and 
executive pension awards, since pensions are granted or calculated as fractions of current 
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salary (Weight, 2013). Scaling compensation variables by salary also controls for higher 
absolute values of total pay, pension, bonus, and equity which are attributable to higher 
base salary. 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 = (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦)/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
We examine the relationship between residual pay and pensions (H1a) as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜷(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 
(1A) 
The Pension/Salary ratio is calculated as the executive’s total pension compensation for 
the year, scaled by salary, Residual pay/Salary is as defined above, and Firm 
Characteristics is a vector of firm-specific variables. We then examine the relationship 
between pensions and performance-sensitive compensation (H1b) as follows:  
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
+ ∑ 𝜷(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 
(1B) 
The independent variables of interest are Bonus/Salary and Equity/Salary, which are 
calculated by dividing bonus and equity grants by salary, respectively.10  
Consistent with prior literature (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Gerakos, 2010), 
we include a vector of firm-level control variables in Models 1A and 1B. We include two 
measures of performance, ROA (operating profit divided by the average of opening and 
closing total assets), and Return (market return for the year). These measures are widely 
used in prior research on executive pay (see Murphy, 1999, and Jenter and Frydman, 
2010, for overviews of this literature). We include Leverage, measured as the ratio of 
long-term debt to total assets. Kalyta and Magnan (2008) argue that highly levered firms 
are less likely to honour future obligations, including those related to pensions, making 
pensions less attractive to CEOs. This implies that CEOs in highly levered firms are less 
                                                          
10
 We do not index compensation values for inflation, since collected pension values are net of 
inflation, and indexing may introduce additional variation into the data (Farrell et al., 2008). 
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likely to accept large pensions as a form of compensation, and may therefore have lower 
pensions. By contrast, Sundaram and Yermack (2007) argue that a positive association 
exists between leverage and pensions, because debt-based compensation reduces the 
agency costs of debt. We therefore make no directional prediction about the sign of this 
variable. Prior literature has also come to mixed conclusions about the role of leverage in 
other types of executive compensation (Lewellen et al., 1987; Ittner et al., 2003).  
We include book-to-market ratio (BTM), the ratio of the book value to market 
value of equity, as an inverse measure of the firm’s growth opportunities and 
organizational complexity (Baber et al., 1996; Smith and Watts, 1992), and firm risk 
(Risk), defined as the average monthly stock return beta over the past three years. As 
pension values are sensitive to age (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007), we include age group 
indicators, since pension awards are likely to be non-linear with age. Because the pattern 
of pension provision may vary by industry, we include industry controls in our model, 
using 2-digit Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) indicators.11 In tabulated results, 
we present standard errors clustered by firm, though our results are not significantly 
different when clustering by firm and year. 
(iv) The role of corporate governance  
Our second analysis focuses on the role of corporate governance in the determination of 
executive pensions (H2). We extend Model 1A to examine how corporate governance 
affects executive pensions, allowing for equilibrium compensation-setting. We estimate 
the following model: 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2%𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3%𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑐𝑜𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4%𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑐𝑜𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6log (𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜷(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 
(2A) 
                                                          
11
 Because our sample is composed of FTSE 100 firms, there are some industries with relatively few 
observations. Estimating the model without industry fixed effects yields qualitatively similar results.  
 19 
We include several monitoring and governance variables based on prior literature: non-
executive director ownership, the busyness and independence of remuneration 
(compensation) committee members, board size, and CEO tenure.  
Our measure of non-executive director ownership, %NonExecOwn, reflects the 
proportion of shares of the firm owned by its non-executive directors. We associate non-
executive director ownership with greater monitoring (Cyert et al., 2002; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), and therefore we predict lower pension awards to executives as non-
executive director ownership increases.  
We expect monitoring to be weakened when directors are busy and have less time 
to devote to their monitoring duties. We refine the measure used by Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006) on busy directors to capture the proportion of busy remuneration committee 
members, %RemcoBusy. We classify members as busy if they have three or more board 
positions. We predict that this measure is positively associated with executive pensions, 
as busy committee members have less time and attention to devote to their duties, and are 
more likely to overlook or not to challenge pension arrangements (Core et al., 1999).  
We expect the presence of non-independent or ‘grey’ directors on the 
remuneration committee to weaken monitoring, because such directors may have a prior 
relationship with the firm or with its executives (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Ryan and 
Wiggins, 2004). The presence of non-independent directors also increases the potential 
for cronyism (Brick et al., 2006), to the mutual benefit of both CEOs and the directors. 
The UK Combined Code (2000) defines independent directors as those ‘free from any 
business or other relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of their 
independent judgement’, on the premise that they are likely to be stronger monitors 
(Combined Code, 2000:§A.3.2). We consider the independence of the remuneration 
committee (%RemcoIndep), as the remuneration committee are the first-line monitors of 
the compensation package at the board level. We predict that stronger monitoring 
associated with remuneration committee independence reduces the success of CEOs in 
obtaining more favourable pension arrangements.  
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We include board size (BoardSize) as a measure of board effectiveness. Prior 
research finds that larger size reduces the potential for an effective board (Yermack, 1996; 
Core et al., 1999). Yermack (1996) finds that smaller boards are more likely to force 
CEOs to accept riskier pay packages. Similarly, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) find that CEOs 
receive less equity pay in firms with more directors, and Core et al. (1999) find that CEO 
pay increases with board size. We therefore expect smaller boards to constrain pensions.  
We draw on prior research considering CEO tenure as a measure of influence over 
the board, and include Tenure, defined as the number of years that the CEO has served on 
the board (Hill and Phan, 1991; Kalyta and Magnan, 2008; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004). 
Long-serving executives may become entrenched, have stronger influence over board 
members, and obtain more favourable compensation packages (Cremers and Palia, 2011).  
Last, we construct a composite measure, GovScore, based on the individual 
governance criteria considered above. We identify firms as well-governed on each of the 
five measures above, measuring the number of dimensions on which the firm is better 
than the median.12 For %NonExecOwn and %RemcoIndep, a firm is classified with 1 
when it is above the median of sample firms. For %RemcoBusy, BoardSize, and Tenure, a 
firm is classified with 1 when it is below the median of sample firms. GovScore has a 
maximum score of 5. Our simplified specification with GovScore is as follows:  
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ ∑ 𝜷(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 
(2B) 
We extend this model further to consider the incremental effect of governance on 
the strength of substitution, including an interaction term, Residual pay/Salary*GovScore. 
Under the managerial power hypothesis, we expect that stronger board monitoring 
constrains the degree of substitution between pensions and residual pay, so that more of 
the compensation package is aligned with performance.  
                                                          
12
 In untabulated analysis, we use a threshold of the top third and find that our results are stronger. 
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(v) Dynamic analysis of pensions and performance-based compensation 
Our analysis of H3 focuses on the dynamic relationship between pensions and 
performance-based compensation from t–1 to t. Based on the managerial power 
hypothesis, H3 predicts a dynamic contemporaneous relationship between changes in 
pensions and declining bonuses or equity, if pensions are used to ‘camouflage’ pay. To 
separately identify decreases in bonuses, we construct the following change model: 
 
𝛥𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
= 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝛥𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐷𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿3𝛥𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐷𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿4𝛥𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐷𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿6𝛥𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 ∗ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐷𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑡
+ ∑ 𝜹(𝛥𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
where the dependent variable is the change in the Pension/Salary ratio for the jth 
executive from t–1 to t. Similarly, ΔBonus/Salary denotes the change in Bonus/Salary 
ratio and BonusSalaryDecreaseDV is an indicator variable coded 1 if there is a decrease 
in the bonus and salary of the jth executive from t–1 to t, and 0 otherwise. The interaction 
term ΔBonus/Salary*BonusSalaryDecreaseDV allows for incremental effects of both 
changes. Changes in equity-based compensation are similarly defined. ΔFirm 
Characteristics is the vector of firm-level variables as in Model 1A in their first 
differenced terms, except for BTM, which we leave undifferenced due to its correlation 
with ΔReturn.  
The change specification allows us to test the dynamic association between 
changes in pensions and decreases in bonuses, controlling for other factors posited by 
prior literature to affect pensions. δ1 corresponds to the change in bonus, δ2 and δ3 (the 
coefficient on interaction term) represent the additional intercept and slope difference for 
decreases in bonuses. The total coefficient for an executive with a decrease in the 
Bonus/Salary ratio is δ1+δ3 with an additional fixed increment of δ2. We adopt the same 
methodology to examine decreases in equity compensation. 
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A positive δ2 coefficient would reflect an additional fixed pension increment for 
executives with decreases in cash-based compensation during the year. A significantly 
negative δ3 coefficient would show the degree to which executives with decreases in their 
bonuses are compensated with additional pension during the same period. A positive δ2 
and negative interaction term δ3 would support H3 that pensions are ‘stealth’ 
compensation which can be used to offset contemporaneous declines in performance-
related compensation.  
5. MAIN FINDINGS 
(i) Pensions as a portfolio mix of total compensation 
Table 4, Columns 1−2 reports results from estimating the relationship between pensions 
and residuals of Total pay (Residual pay), modelled on economic considerations 
(capturing ‘excess’ or ‘deficient’ visible pay), with industry controls. For brevity, we do 
not report results from our model estimating Total pay, but our results are generally 
consistent with those from earlier studies (Murphy, 1999). Results show that pensions are 
significantly negatively related to Residual pay, suggesting that executives with lower-
than-expected observable pay receive a higher pension. The coefficient to Residual 
pay/Salary is negative as predicted and statistically significant at the 5% level and 1% 
level for CEOs and non-CEOs, respectively. This result supports H1a and is consistent 
with an overall equilibrium compensation outcome.  
Table 4, Columns 3−4 shows that pensions are significantly negatively related to 
bonuses. The coefficient on Bonus/Salary is negative as predicted, and statistically 
significant at the 1% level and 10% level for CEOs and non-CEOs, respectively. This 
evidence supports H1b, suggesting that pensions function as a cross-sectional substitute 
for performance-based bonuses. Executives with larger bonuses receive lower pensions, 
and vice versa, though economically the rate of substitution is relatively low, at 
approximately 4−9%. We find no substitution effect on equity, and therefore focus on 
bonuses in subsequent tests.13  
                                                          
13
 Untabulated results from the pre-crisis period (2004–2008) show a marginally significant 
substitution effect on equity for non-CEOs.  
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Nonetheless, the negative relationship between pensions and residual pay may 
also imply that the complex and opaque nature of pensions provides executives with a 
‘stealth’ mechanism to reduce the size of their total visible compensation. We are 
therefore cautious to interpret these results as implying causality in the residual pay-
pension or bonus-pension tradeoff, where executives seek higher pensions in exchange 
for lower bonuses or other pay. Firms that grant higher pensions may be more 
conservative in granting bonuses or equity, or vice versa. Our findings contrast with those 
of Cadman and Vincent (2014), who find that pensions function as a low-risk 
complement to the rest of the compensation package, as total compensation (and 
individual elements) is higher for executives with pensions. In their setting, however, 
scale effects may imply that firms paying executives a higher salary, bonuses, and equity 
in dollar terms also pay higher pensions, resulting in higher total compensation. 
Among our firm-level control variables, pensions are negatively related to risk, 
suggesting either that executives are less willing to accept pensions from riskier firms, or 
that riskier firms may offer a greater proportion of their compensation in the form of 
bonus and equity to increase alignment between pay and performance.  
--------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
---------------------------------- 
(ii) The role of corporate governance 
Table 5 presents results from our tests of H2. Our results show that higher quality 
corporate governance reduces the magnitude of CEO pensions. Stronger board 
monitoring also has a constraining effect on the degree of substitution between pensions 
and residual pay, implying a reduced scope and potential for rent extraction via pensions. 
Column 1 shows that non-executive ownership (%NonExecOwn) has a negative and 
significant relationship with CEO pension, indicating that additional monitoring 
associated with ownership constrains the level of pension. While our negative finding on 
Remuneration committee independence (%RemcoIndep) points towards greater 
independent or unconflicted monitoring of pay constraining CEO pensions, it is not 
statistically significant when including industry fixed effects, as tabulated. Since the 
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average independence level in our sample firms is high, non-independence may be 
concentrated in certain industries and be subsumed by industry fixed effects.  
BoardSize is positively related to the magnitude of CEO pension awards, 
consistent with weaker monitoring in a larger board (Core et al., 1999; Yermack, 1996). 
log(Tenure), as a measure of CEO power, is positively related to pensions, consistent with 
prior research, showing that entrenched or longer-tenured CEOs receive higher pensions 
(Cremers and Palia, 2011). However, the coefficient is only marginally significant; a 
median CEO Tenure of 4.9 years may not be sufficiently strong to build entrenched 
relationships.  The coefficient to %RemcoBusy is negative but not significant. Our mixed 
finding on this variable is consistent with earlier mixed evidence on busy directors, 
providing no evidence that they shirk their responsibilities.  
Table 5, Columns 2−3, reports results of tests based on our composite GovScore 
measure. The significantly negative coefficient to GovScore suggests that each added 
dimension of governance above the median is associated with a 12−14% lower 
Pension/Salary ratio. The interaction term between governance and residual pay 
(Residual pay/Salary*GovScore) is marginally significant and positive, suggesting that 
better governance not only constrains the magnitude of pensions, but also reduces the 
degree of substitution. The latter is consistent with prior literature on governance and the 
balance of pay packages (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004).14  
Our findings on the mitigating role of strong corporate governance on pensions 
also build on earlier work on the relationship between CEO power and non-tax qualified 
supplemental pensions (Kalyta and Magnan, 2008) by considering the governance 
environment. They also complement the findings of Kabir and Minhat (2009) who find a 
positive relationship between CEO power and pension levels.  
 
                                                          
14
 In additional analysis, we include interactions of each individual corporate governance variable with 
Residual pay as an extension to Eq. (2A). We continue to find a significantly negative association 
between Pension and Residual pay in this extended model, and the magnitude of substitution is also 
qualitatively similar. The main results on the monitoring role of corporate governance on the 
magnitude of pensions also hold after controlling for individual interaction effects. In addition, we find 
that the degree of substitution between Pension and Residual pay is reduced in smaller and more 
independent boards.  
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---------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
---------------------------------- 
(iii) Dynamic pension-bonus substitution 
Table 6 presents regression estimates from our dynamic model examining changes in the 
size of the pension and other elements of compensation. In this set of tests, we include 
only executives that have been in their current position for at least two years, and 
therefore our sample size is reduced. In Columns 1–2, we consider only movements in 
bonus, while in Columns 3–4, we include corresponding variables for changes in equity-
based compensation.  
Our results for both CEOs and non-CEOs show a general upward movement in 
pensions, both when bonuses are increasing and decreasing, shown by positive (though 
not significant) coefficients to both ∆Bonus/Salary and BonusSalaryDecreaseDV. 
However, the significantly negative coefficient to the interaction term (∆Bonus/Salary 
*BonusSalaryDecreaseDV) shows that pensions increase at a higher rate for executives 
experiencing a decrease in their bonus. On a time-series basis, pensions can therefore 
function as a substitute for declines in bonuses, which attract more public scrutiny. Our 
results are stronger for CEOs both statistically and economically compared to non-CEOs, 
consistent with CEOs being in a stronger bargaining position with respect to 
compensation than non-CEOs, and being able to extract larger rents than non-CEOs. The 
board may be more concerned about adverse consequences of reducing CEO 
compensation, such as demotivation, and more likely to err on the side of generosity, in 
the CEO’s favour. However, we find no evidence for pensions as a dynamic substitute for 
equity, consistent with our cross-sectional results. Overall, our evidence suggests that 
pensions can be used as a dynamic substitute for bonus compensation. While reductions 
in visible, performance-based compensation improve the firm’s potential distance to 
outrage (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004b), particularly in times of poor performance, they may 
be offset by increases in less visible pensions.  
--------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
---------------------------------- 
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(iv) CEO pensions and financial crisis 
Since our sample period encompasses the 2008 financial crisis and the following period, 
we next consider how CEO pensions and the pension-substitution relationships have 
changed during our sample period. Greater investor, academic and regulatory scrutiny of 
pensions coincided with the financial crisis, which intensified the public debate on 
‘reward for failure.’ However, prior research has not yet examined the impact of crisis on 
executive pensions, as sample periods have largely ended before the crisis (Gerakos, 
2010; Cadman and Vincent, 2014; Kabir and Minhat, 2009). Consequently, in this section 
we examine whether there are changes in CEO pensions in relation to overall 
compensation, following the 2008 financial crisis.15 
The predicted effect of a financial crisis on the relationship between pensions and 
other elements of compensation is unclear. Compensation contracts may change over 
time, and different patterns of executive compensation and incentives may emerge in 
response to financial and economic crisis. As a crisis is likely to bring about changes in 
the risk, product, and capital market environment of firms, it may induce changes in 
compensation structure and redesign of optimal executive pay contracts. For example, 
prior research suggests that intervention can lead to a change in compensation structure 
(Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1993; Brown and Lee, 2011).  
First, changes to compensation structures arising from the 2008 financial crisis 
may have longer-term effects, as firms allow time to re-evaluate the success of new 
policies, and as new best practices spread through the market. Second, changes in 
accounting for pensions, increased uncertainty in equity markets, and increasing costs and 
liabilities of defined benefit pensions may lead firms to reduce defined benefit pension 
entitlements (Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009), and transfer risk back to individuals by shifting 
pensions towards defined contribution plans or salary supplements. Third, changes to UK 
tax policies, imposing lifetime and annual limits on the tax-deductibility of pensions, may 
have resulted in pensions becoming less attractive to firms and executives with significant 
                                                          
15
 Further robustness checks show that our main findings hold in the sub-period ending in 2008, prior to 
the financial crisis. 
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entitlements, as they result in not only additional taxes for over-limit executives but also 
additional tax costs for firms providing these benefits.  
For these reasons, we hypothesize that pensions to executives decrease in the later 
part of our sample, and the substitution effect is weakened.16 We investigate whether 
pensions and the tradeoff between pensions and excess compensation change during our 
sample period, estimating the following model: 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
+ 𝛽5𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
+ ∑ 𝜷(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 
(4) 
We define PostCrisis as firm-years ending after 2008, with an indicator variable, 
PostCrisis, coded 1 for these firm-years and 0 otherwise.17 The coefficient to PostCrisis 
reflects a fixed effect difference in pensions after 2008, while the interaction term 
(Residual pay/Salary*PostCrisis) allows us to examine how the substitution effect differs 
following the crisis. A positive coefficient to the interaction term would imply a 
weakening substitution effect following the crisis.  
Results in Table 7 show how CEO pensions differ between pre- and post-crisis 
years. Our results show that CEO pensions are significantly lower following the financial 
crisis, in comparison to the pre-crisis period, with a reduction in the Pension/Salary ratio 
of 0.16 to 0.18 (a reduction of 21% from the average Pension/Salary ratio during the pre-
crisis period). The coefficient on Residual pay/Salary is negative (–0.04) and highly 
significant, consistent with earlier specifications (Tables 4–5). However, the significant 
and positive coefficient to the interaction term, Residual pay/Salary*PostCrisis, suggests 
that the substitution effect is weakened after the financial crisis, consistent with structural 
changes in corporate pension policies following the crisis. Results in Columns 2–3 
                                                          
16
 An alternative prediction is that crisis-induced shocks to operating performance and stock prices may 
lead to reductions in performance-based compensation to executives (Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1993). 
The managerial power hypothesis predicts that firms use pensions as a substitute for declines in 
performance-based compensation, as pensions attract less public attention. However, our data do not 
show significant declines in performance-based compensation following the crisis. 
17
 Adopting alternative cutoff dates for coding of the PostCrisis indicator yields similar results.  
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suggest that the decreases in pensions and substitution are incremental to the mitigating 
effects of corporate governance, which remain robust across both sub-periods of our 
sample. 
A number of factors may help to explain our findings. First, financial distress, 
uncertainty, and the resulting additional scrutiny are likely to result in changes to bonus, 
equity, and in particular, pension policies, contributing to a weakened substitution 
effect.18 Second, the decreased attractiveness of pensions to both firms and executives for 
institutional reasons may have led to a reduction in their use during the post-crisis period. 
Third, while financial crisis may bring about immediate changes to compensation 
policies, subsequent review, assessment, and recontracting during the recovery period 
may be a lengthy process, resulting in longer-term changes. Overall, the crisis and 
institutional changes in the UK setting are reflected in structural changes to the magnitude 
and role of pensions in executive compensation, as post-crisis pension awards are 
significantly lower than pre-crisis levels and substitution effects are weakened.  
--------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
---------------------------------- 
6. ADDITIONAL TESTS 
(i) Foreign exchange listing and product market competition 
Empirical evidence shows that product market relationships affect executive 
compensation (e.g. Cunat and Guadalupe, 2005; Subramanian, 2013). These may also 
have an influence on pensions, as firms with greater product market power may be able to 
offer more generous pension compensation to retain human capital. To control for this 
possibility, we include a proxy for product market power, SalesShare, calculated as the 
ratio of a firm’s sales to aggregate industry sales in the same year.  
Prior research finds that capital market relationships in the form of foreign 
exchange listing affect executive pay, though evidence is mixed (Gerakos et al., 2013; 
Fernandes et al., 2013). Gerakos et al. (2013) find that US exchange listing is associated 
                                                          
18
 We also perform a separate robustness analysis using a measure of financial distress based on a 
modified Altman (1968) Z-score, and find that distress has a similarly constraining effect on 
substitution. 
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with higher cash compensation for UK CEOs. In our context, cross-listed firms may be 
seen as competing for labour in a higher-paying peer group, or have additional resources. 
To test the relationship between US exchange listing and pensions, we include an 
indicator identifying firms cross-listed in the US (SEC). However, we have no ex-ante 
reason to predict that cross-listing is related to higher pensions in particular, compared to 
other types of pay.  
Results in Table 8 show that the coefficient to SalesShare is positive and 
significantly related to the Pension/Salary ratio, suggesting that CEOs of firms with 
higher product market power have higher pension compensation. We find no evidence 
that foreign exchange listing (SEC) is related to CEO pensions. However, our inferences 
from Tables 4 and 5, examining performance-sensitive compensation, residual pay, and 
governance are unchanged in these specifications (Columns 1–3). We also re-estimate our 
model of pre-and post-financial crisis changes (Column 4), as product market competition 
may become more important during a period of economic recession. Our findings on 
changes after the financial crisis on the tradeoff between pension and excess 
compensation remain unchanged.  
--------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
---------------------------------- 
(ii) Differential pension types  
Our measure of pensions includes different types of pensions, which may entail different 
levels of risks for executives and firms alike. Therefore, the relative proportion of these 
components within the total pension may have implications for our findings and 
inferences. To check the robustness of our main findings to these issues, we partition our 
CEO sample between those who have a large majority of their pension award in a defined 
benefit pension plan, and those who do not. We classify CEOs as having a high 
proportion of defined benefit pensions if defined benefit pensions constitute more than  
85% of their pension compensation.19 We then re-estimate our baseline analyses on cross-
sectional substitution between pension, bonus, and equity.  
                                                          
19
 Our results are similar if partitioning the sample between CEOs who receive defined-benefit pension 
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Our untabulated results show that the cross-sectional substitution between 
pensions and bonuses holds for both CEOs who derive the majority of their pension 
compensation from defined benefit pensions, and those CEOs who have a smaller or no 
defined benefit pension award. For high defined benefit CEOs, we find that the 
magnitude of substitution is higher. Nonetheless, we continue to observe a significant 
substitution effect for CEOs with small defined benefit pensions, and other types of 
pensions. Our results show that our main findings are not primarily driven by a certain 
pension type (i.e. defined benefit pensions). Further analysis including SEC and 
SalesShare in high- and low-defined benefit CEOs shows similar results. 
(iii) The effect of taxes 
We note in sections 2 and 5.4 that pensions are deductible for income tax purposes, but 
that HMRC limits the amount of retirement benefit that is tax deductible annually and 
over an individual’s lifetime.20 As a robustness check, we construct an indicator variable 
for executives whose total pension earnings exceed the HMRC’s lifetime and annual 
allowances. We expect that already being over the HMRC limit has a negative effect on 
the magnitude of pension compensation (Models 1 and 2) and changes in pensions 
(Model 3). Our untabulated results show that individuals over the lifetime limit receive 
significantly lower pension awards and being over annual and lifetime limits reduces 
changes in pension. However, our main findings on the relationships between pensions, 
residual compensation and corporate governance remain qualitatively unchanged when 
including tax limits in our models.  
(iv)The role of compensation consultants  
Our evidence shows that pension arrangements for executives can be difficult to discern 
and understand. Their complex nature provides an opportunity for compensation 
consultants to help remuneration committee members understand regulations, market 
practices, contractual obligations, and other aspects of compensation. Like in the US, UK 
                                                                                                                                                                      
awards only, and those who receive other types of pension compensation or mixed pension awards.   
20 These limits became effective from April 2006. This maximum, known as the lifetime allowance, 
was £1.6 million in 2006/07, the first year of its imposition, increasing to £1.8 million by 2010/11. The 
annual limit on tax-deductible pension savings was £215,000 in 2006/07 (£255,000 by 2010/11). 
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compensation consultants provide a number of other services (such as below-board level 
compensation consulting, actuarial valuation, pension consulting, serving as pension 
trustee, or auditing). In addition to independent compensation consultants, the UK market 
for compensation consulting is serviced by large international HR consulting firms and 
audit firms (Conyon et al., 2009; Goh and Gupta, 2010; Voulgaris et al., 2010). Therefore, 
the potential to cross-sell additional services or maintain cross-selling contracts may 
result in higher compensation. Consistent with this hypothesis, Murphy and Sandino 
(2010) find that executive compensation is higher in firms with consultants who cross-sell 
services, for a sample of US and Canadian firms. However, Conyon et al. (2009) and 
Cadman et al. (2010) find no evidence of higher or more favourable compensation with 
consultants who have cross-selling incentives.  
We examine the relationship between pensions and compensation consultants for 
the sample period 2004–2008, a period for which we have compensation consultant data. 
In particular, we investigate more closely those with incentives to cross-sell services 
(both pension-related and otherwise). For firms with more than one consultant, we focus 
on the consultant who is either retained by the compensation committee or the primary 
consultant as identified in the disclosure. Our sample firms generally employ a specialist 
compensation consultant which focuses primarily on compensation consulting (33%), a 
large HR firm which offers other HR consulting and pension-related services (Towers 
Perrin, Watson Wyatt, Hewitt Associates, or Mercer; 35%), or one of the Big 4 
accounting firms, who have a large share of the UK compensation consulting market, and 
who also offer auditing, and actuarial or other consulting services (26%). Last, we 
separately examine cases where the remuneration committee identifies a consultant who 
provides them with advice specifically on pension-related matters for executives (18%).  
In contrast to agency predictions of compensation consultant conflicts of interest, 
we find no evidence that pensions (or total compensation including pensions) are 
significantly higher in firms that retain a large HR consultant, a Big 4 accounting firm, or 
a specific pension consultant, using either logged or scaled measures of pension. These 
results support those of Cadman et al. (2010) and Conyon et al. (2009) on conflicts of 
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interest, specifically in the pension context. Our findings are not surprising, however, in 
light of Conyon et al. (2009) and Voulgaris et al. (2010), who show that the impact of 
compensation consultants in UK firms occurs primarily through equity compensation.  
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper examines pensions as a form of executive compensation, their relationship 
with other elements of compensation, and their role in the overall executive compensation 
package. The relatively few earlier studies on pensions have not yet agreed on whether 
pensions function as a substitute or complement to the rest of the pay package, with 
inconclusive evidence. We contribute to emerging research and the debate on executive 
pensions, using a sample of CEOs and executives of large UK firms during the 2004–
2011 period. We find that, after controlling for scale differences across observations, 
executive pensions are negatively and significantly related to the rest of the compensation 
package, particularly performance-sensitive compensation in the form of bonuses. This 
suggests a cross-sectional substitution between pensions and more visible and 
performance-sensitive elements of pay. We further show that CEO pensions are 
significantly higher and the above tradeoffs are stronger in firms with weaker governance, 
after controlling for equilibrium total pay. In such settings, CEOs therefore receive both 
higher pensions and more favourable compensation arrangements. We contribute new 
evidence on the dynamic association between declining bonuses and increasing pensions 
over time, showing that pensions can be a means of offsetting bonus decreases in less-
visible ways, consistent with a managerial power view of compensation.  
Our analyses and discussion of the UK setting contribute to understanding of the 
institutional environment and practices which influence the use of executive pensions, 
incremental to the US setting. When partitioning the sample into sub-periods, we find that 
the magnitude of pensions has declined and the substitution effect weakened in years 
following the financial crisis. In addition to greater scrutiny of pensions arising from the 
crisis, changes in the tax regime may have significantly affected executives, who have 
substantially higher pensions than rank-and-file employees and average earners. In our 
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descriptive evidence, we provide new insights on the prevalence and size of pensions in 
the UK executive labour market. We show that pension arrangements can be complex, 
comprising multiple elements, and discuss the complex nature of pension-related 
disclosures, which has hampered the ability of users to assemble an overall view of 
pensions. Combined with a lack of investor attention to pensions, complexity and opacity 
can lead to pensions being used as a mechanism for compensating for deficiencies in 
more visible elements of compensation. Greater public attention and shareholder 
monitoring may therefore reduce the strength of the ‘camouflage’ associated with 
pensions. Given that pension data has been largely uncollected by UK data providers, 
collection by researchers or secondary data providers in the future would improve the 
ability to draw inferences about incentives from various components of pay. Regulatory 
changes requiring standardized pension disclosures from 2014 will allow future research 
to give greater attention to pensions as a type of executive pay.  
As executive pensions are relatively unexplored, there are a number of further 
avenues of research on the topic of pensions. We have highlighted several differences in 
characteristics of executive pension plans compared to those of rank-and-file employees. 
Further research comparing executive pension incentives to those of rank-and-file 
employees would provide additional insights into theories on executive compensation. 
Researchers may also examine pension awards in light of the health of corporate pension 
funds, and potential drivers of changes in pension benefits.  
One limitation of our study is that our institutional setting is constrained to the 
UK, one of the few countries to require disclosure of pension benefits, and one of the 
leading countries in terms of compensation disclosure. Our research design has also not 
incorporated a direct control for pension-performance sensitivity. However, our paper 
provides the first step in this direction by considering performance-related tradeoffs 
within the compensation package. Exploring the pension-performance relationship and 
the effect of corporate governance on this relationship might be an avenue for future 
research. We also caution that our findings may not be generalizable beyond our sample 
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period, as our analyses show changing patterns to pensions in the latter part of our 
sample, and that the use of pensions is dynamic and responsive to regulatory change.  
Our findings are relevant for compensation and governance researchers, and have 
important policy implications, suggesting the need to standardize and enhance the quality 
of disclosures for this important element of compensation. Overall, our findings highlight 
pensions as an important element of executive pay, and the need for greater attention 
from researchers and users to draw appropriate inferences.  
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Appendix A: Examples of Executive Pension Disclosures and Transfer Out of 
Defined Benefit Pension Benefits in the UK 
 
1. Extract from HSBC Holdings plc 2006 Remuneration Report (pp. 286–287) 
 
This extract from HSBC Holdings’s pension disclosure provides an example of the 
transfer out of defined benefit pension entitlements into a defined contribution plan. 
 
[On] 31 March 2006 M F Geoghegan ceased membership of, and the accrual of 
benefits under, the HSBC International Staff Retirement Benefits Scheme [….] M F 
Geoghegan transferred all his benefits out of the HSBC International Staff 
Retirement Benefits Scheme on 31 March 2006 with a transfer payment from the 
Scheme of £12,918,000 into the HSBC Asia Holdings Pension Plan on a defined 
contribution basis. There were no pension liabilities under the HSBC International 
Staff Retirement Benefits Scheme for M F Geoghegan at 31 December 2006. 
 
2. Extract from Serco plc 2005 Remuneration Report (pp. 67–68)  
 
This extract from Serco’s executive pension disclosure provides an example of executives 
with different types of arrangements and with some components of untabulated pension 
awards (defined contribution pension and cash supplements are not included in the 
primary compensation or pension tables but are disclosed in footnotes to the pension 
table). Note (g) also demonstrates discretion on the part of the compensation committee to 
make additional pension payments. 
 
The Directors receive pension and life assurance benefits consistent with those 
provided by other leading companies. The details of the defined benefit schemes 
operated by the Group are set out in note 28. In the event of death in service, each 
scheme provides for a lump sum payment as well as a dependants' pension. The 
accrued pension benefits of all Directors under the Serco Pension and Life Assurance 
Scheme, which is a defined benefit scheme, are as follows: 
 
 
 
Transfer value 
of accrued 
benefits at 31 
December 
2005 
(1) 
Transfer value 
of accrued 
benefits at 31 
December 
2004 
(2) 
Director’s 
contributions 
for the year 
(3) 
Increase in 
transfer value 
during the 
year 
(4)=(1)-(2)-(3) 
Gross 
increase in 
accrued 
pension 
during the 
year 
(5) 
Increase in 
accrued 
pension 
during the 
year, net of 
inflation 
(6) 
 
Value of 
net 
increase 
in accrual 
over the 
year 
(7) 
Total 
accrued 
pension at 
year end 
 (8) 
 £ £ £ £ £ p.a. £ p.a. £ £ p.a. 
K  S Beeston 1,706,038 1,153,549 31,511 520,978 41,677 36,809 306,390 221,585 
C  R Hyman 259,286 183,260 15,705 60,321 4,390 3,724 17,549 29,040 
A  M Jenner 95,513 54,965 15,705 24,843 3,850 3,598 10,326 13,200 
 
Selected notes to pension benefits: 
 
g) C R Hyman also benefits from a defined contribution arrangement to which the 
Company contributed prior to April 2005. The Company contributions to this 
arrangement were 15 per cent of remuneration in excess of the Permitted 
Maximum under the approved Scheme. These amounted to £10,815 in 2005. 
C R Hyman has received non-pensionable cash payments totalling £98,406 
during 2005 in place of Company contributions to the defined contribution 
arrangement. In September 2004 he received a non-pensionable cash payment of 
 40 
£95,400 in recognition of the higher contribution due from his time of 
appointment as Chief Executive. 
h) A M Jenner also benefits from a defined contribution arrangement to which the 
Company contributed prior to June 2005. The Company contributions to this 
arrangement were 15 per cent of remuneration in excess of the Permitted 
Maximum under the approved Scheme. These amounted to £7,690 in 2005.  
A M Jenner has received non-pensionable cash payments totalling £51,189 
during 2005 in place of Company contributions to the defined contribution 
arrangement. 
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Table 1: Firm-level Descriptive Statistics  
Variable  n Mean Q1 Median Q3 S.D. 
LogAssets 585 15.87 14.86 15.71 16.66 1.37 
ROA 585 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.08 
Return 585 0.16 0.00 0.16 0.35 0.35 
Leverage 585 0.21 0.09 0.19 0.32 0.15 
Risk 585 1.06 0.59 0.94 1.42 0.66 
BTM 585 0.36 0.11 0.23 0.44 0.39 
%NonExecOwn 585 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 
%RemcoBusy  585 0.43 0.25 0.40 0.60 0.25 
%RemcoIndep 585 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.15 
BoardSize 585 10.75 9.00 11.00 12.00 2.41 
GovScore 585 3.25 2.00 3.00 4.00 1.33 
 
Notes to Table 1: 
This table reports selected descriptive statistics for key regression 
variables. LogAssets is measured as the logarithmic transformation of the 
average of opening and closing total assets; ROA is operating profit scaled 
by the average of opening and closing total assets; Return is the total 
return to shareholders during the year, reflecting share price appreciation 
and dividend yield; Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets; Risk is the 
beta of the firm’s monthly returns over the past three years, and BTM is the 
ratio of the book value of equity to market value of equity. These variables 
are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. Our governance variables are 
defined as follows: %NonExecOwn is the fraction of the firm’s shares that 
are owned by non-executive directors, %RemcoBusy is the proportion of 
members of the remuneration committee that hold 3 or more board 
positions, %RemcoIndep is the proportion of the remuneration committee 
that is composed of formally declared independent directors; BoardSize is 
the number of executive and non-executive directors on the firm’s board of 
the directors, and GovScore is a composite index of the number of 
dimensions on which the sample firm is better than the median on 
individual firm governance characteristics, as well as CEO Tenure. 
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Table 2: Executive-level Descriptive Statistics  
Variable  n Mean Q1 Median Q3 S.D. 
Salary 2,140 486 331 436 609 223 
Bonus 2,140 450 143 300 589 494 
Equity 2,140 1,492 379 866 1,768 1,998 
Total pension 2,140 352 70 185 414 464 
Age 2,140 51 47 51 55 6.2 
Tenure 2,140 6.4 2.7 4.9 8.8 5.0 
 
Notes to Table 2 (Monetary values in £thousands): 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for all executive directors in the sample (both CEOs and 
non-CEOs). Equity is the value of short- and long-term incentive plans and stock option 
granted during the year. Stock option grants are measured at grant date using the Black-Scholes 
model, and incentive plans are valued at full value using closing market price at the end of the 
year of the grant (the fiscal year of the date of annual report). Total pension is the sum of all 
pension-related components (change in defined benefit pension entitlements, defined 
contribution pensions, and salary supplement). Age is age of executive directors in the sample. 
Tenure is measured as number of years on the board of directors. All variables except Age and 
Tenure are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. In our regression model, we use the 
logarithmic transformation of Tenure: log(Tenure).  
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Table 3: Breakdown of Pension Arrangements among All Executives 
 
Types of Pension Arrangement(s) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Defined benefit only 193 166 114 92 80 80 80 14 819 
 (53.3%) (48.7%) (38.1%) (32.5%) (29.5%) (31.0%) (30.2%) (23.0%) (38.3%) 
Defined contribution only 59 57 48 65 60 72 60 13 434 
 (16.3%) (16.7%) (16.1%) (23.0%) (22.1%) (27.9%) (22.6%) (21.3%) (20.2%) 
Salary supplement only  7 14 19 29 35 29 47 16 196 
       in lieu of pension (1.9%) (4.1%) (6.4%) (10.3%) (12.9%) (11.2%) (17.7%) (26.2%) (9.16%) 
Defined benefit + defined  39 40 21 12 16 14 14 1 157 
      contribution (10.8%) (11.7%) (7.0%) (4.2%) (5.9%) (5.4%) (5.3%) (1.6%) (7.3%) 
Defined benefit + salary  26 24 47 53 51 34 26 9 270 
       supplement (7.2%) (7.0%) (15.7%) (18.7%) (18.8%) (13.2%) (9.8%) (14.8%) (12.6%)  
Defined benefit + defined  8 10 14 3 1 2 3 0 41 
    contribution+ salary supplement (2.2%) (2.9%) (4.7%) (1.1%) (0.4%) (0.78%) (1.13%) (0.0%) (1.9%) 
Defined contribution + salary            15 18 25 15 10 8 10 4 105 
    supplement (4.1%) (5.3%) (8.4%) (5.3%) (3.7%) (3.1%) (3.8%) (6.6%) (4.9%) 
No pension provision 15 12 11 14 18 19 25 4 118 
 (4.1%) (3.5%) (3.7%) (5.0%) (6.6%) (7.4%) (9.4%) (6.6%) (5.5%) 
Total number of executives 362 341 299 283 271 258 265 61 2,140 
 
Notes to Table 3: 
Table 3 identifies the type of pension plan(s) provided for all executives (both CEOs and non–CEOs) in the sample during the 2004–2011 period, with all 
permutations and combinations of defined benefit and defined contribution pensions, and salary supplements in lieu of pension awards. Percentages of the annual 
total are shown in parentheses.  
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Table 4: Pension Compensation Levels and Other Elements of Total Compensation  
 
 (1) 
CEOs Only 
(2) 
Non–CEO 
Executives 
(3) 
CEOs Only 
(4) 
Non–CEO 
Executives 
Variables 
Pension/ 
Salary 
Pension/ 
Salary 
Pension/ 
Salary 
Pension/ 
Salary 
Residual pay/Salary –0.02** –0.02***   
 (–2.04) (–2.92)   
Bonus/Salary   –0.09*** –0.04* 
   (–3.18) (–1.76) 
Equity/Salary   –0.00 –0.01 
   (–0.05) (–1.12) 
ROA –0.15 0.36 –0.10 0.51 
 (–0.21) (0.69) (–0.13) (0.92) 
Return –0.17 –0.09 –0.17 –0.11 
 (–1.24) (–0.89) (–1.22) (–1.03) 
Leverage 0.52 0.14 0.39 0.10 
 (1.07) (0.45) (0.79) (0.33) 
Risk –0.17** –0.13*** –0.14** –0.12** 
 (–2.56) (–2.76) (–2.20) (–2.43) 
BTM –0.09 0.13 –0.15 0.11 
 (–0.65) (1.13) (–1.10) (0.98) 
Constant 0.85* 0.37 0.89* 0.36 
 (1.96) (1.59) (1.98) (1.50) 
     
AgeGroup dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 585 1,555 585 1,555 
Adj. R–squared 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.19 
     
Notes to Table 4: 
This table reports coefficient estimates and t–statistics (in parentheses) for OLS regression 
models estimating the relationship between Pension and Residual pay (Columns 1–2) and 
Pension, Bonus, and Equity (Columns 3–4) for both CEOs and non-CEO executives. We 
estimate the following models: 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝜷(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 
(1A) 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
+ ∑𝜷(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 
(1B) 
Residual pay is the unexplained compensation from an OLS regression estimating total 
visible compensation based on economic determinants. All other variables are as defined 
in Table 1. White t–statistics are based on heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors after 
clustering by firm; results are similar when clustering by both firm and year. 
***
 p < 0.01, 
**
 
p < 0.05, 
*
 < 0.10 
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Table 5: CEO Pensions and Corporate Governance Characteristics 
 
 
(1) 
CEOs Only 
(2) 
CEOs Only 
(3) 
CEOs Only 
Variables 
Pension/ 
Salary 
Pension/ 
Salary 
Pension/ 
Salary 
    
Residual pay/Salary –0.02** –0.02** –0.07** 
 (–2.52) (–2.04) (–2.19) 
%NonExecOwn –0.14***   
 (–3.31)   
%RemcoBusy 0.18   
    (1.10)   
%RemcoIndep –0.51   
 (–1.56)   
BoardSize 0.07***   
 (3.59)   
log(Tenure) 0.13*   
 (1.69)   
GovScore  –0.12*** –0.14*** 
  (–3.95) (–4.21) 
Residual pay/Salary*GovScore   0.01* 
      (1.92) 
Constant 0.01 1.09*** 1.11*** 
 (0.02) (2.81) (2.89) 
    
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
AgeGroup dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 585 585 585 
Adj. R–squared 0.22 0.19 0.20 
 
Notes to Table 5: 
This table reports coefficient estimates and t–statistics (in parentheses) for OLS 
regression models estimating the relationship between Pension, Residual pay, and 
individual corporate governance measures (Column 1), a composite GovScore (Column 
2), and GovScore with an interaction term, Residual pay/Salary*GovScore (Column 3), 
for CEOs. We estimate the following baseline models: 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2%𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3%𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑐𝑜𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4%𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑐𝑜𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6log (𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑗𝑖𝑡 + +∑𝜷(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 
(2A) 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ ∑𝜷(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 
(2B) 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. White t–statistics are based on heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors after clustering by firm; results are similar when clustering by 
both firm and year. 
***
 p < 0.01, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
*
 < 0.10 
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Table 6: Changes in Executive Pensions and Other Elements of Compensation  
 
 (1) 
CEOs Only  
 
(2) 
Non–CEO 
Executives 
(3) 
CEOs Only 
 
(4) 
Non–CEO 
Executives 
Variables 
∆Pension/ 
Salary 
∆Pension/ 
Salary 
∆Pension/ 
Salary 
∆Pension/ 
Salary 
     
∆Bonus/Salary 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.07 
 (1.33) (0.78) (1.55) (0.83) 
BonusSalaryDecreaseDV 0.18 0.13 0.21 0.14 
 (1.33) (1.36) (1.48) (1.43) 
∆Bonus/Salary*BonusSalaryDecreaseDV –0.20** –0.09* –0.20** –0.09* 
    (–2.35) (–1.87) (–2.42) (–1.69) 
∆Equity/Salary    –0.02 –0.01 
   (–0.70) (–0.31) 
EquityDecreaseDV   0.00 0.00 
   (0.00) (0.05) 
∆Equity/Salary*EquityDecreaseDV   0.01 –0.00 
         (0.20) (–0.11) 
∆ROA 0.95 1.38 0.88 1.39 
 (0.61) (1.26) (0.55) (1.22) 
∆Return 0.05 0.18*** 0.06 0.19*** 
 (0.46) (2.78) (0.53) (2.79) 
∆Leverage 0.40 –0.11 0.38 –0.13 
 (1.01) (–0.18) (0.98) (–0.22) 
∆Risk 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
 (0.24) (0.37) (0.18) (0.30) 
BTM 0.39** 0.21* 0.37* 0.20 
 (2.14) (1.69) (1.72) (1.58) 
Constant 0.68*** 0.02 0.65** 0.03 
 (2.80) (0.12) (2.56) (0.26) 
     
AgeGroup dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 417 976 417 976 
Adj. R–squared 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
 
Notes to Table 6: 
This table reports coefficient estimates and t–statistics (in parentheses) for fixed effects regression models 
estimating the relationships between ∆Pension/Salary and ∆Bonus/Salary with interaction term, 
∆Bonus/Salary*BonusSalaryDecreaseDV, in Columns 1−2, adding ∆Equity/Salary with interaction term, 
∆Equity/Salary*EquityDecreaseDV, in Columns 3−4. These capture the dynamic association between 
decreases in performance-related pay components and changes in pensions. We estimate the following 
model: 
𝛥𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
= 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝛥𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐷𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿3𝛥𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐷𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝛥𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿5𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐷𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿6𝛥𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 ∗ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐷𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑡
+ ∑𝜹(𝛥𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
BonusSalaryDecreaseDV and EquityDecreaseDV are indicator variables coded to 1 when there is a 
decrease in the Bonus and Salary, and Equity, respectively, and zero otherwise. ∆ is the change operator, 
with all other variables as defined in Table 1. White t–statistics are based on heteroskedastic-consistent 
standard errors after clustering by firm. 
***
 p < 0.01, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
*
 < 0.10 
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Table 7: CEO Pensions and Financial Crisis 
 
 (1) 
CEOs Only 
(2) 
CEOs Only 
(3) 
CEOs Only 
Variables 
Pension/ 
Salary 
Pension/ 
Salary 
Pension/ 
Salary 
     
Residual pay/Salary  –0.04*** –0.03*** –0.07*** 
           (–3.92) (–3.73) (–2.71) 
PostCrisis –0.17** –0.18** –0.16** 
 (–2.44) (–2.61) (–2.44) 
PostCrisis*Residual pay/Salary 0.03** 0.03** 0.03* 
 (2.44) (2.05) (1.86) 
GovScore  –0.12*** –0.13*** 
  (–3.66) (–3.85) 
GovScore*Residual pay/Salary   0.01* 
   (1.73) 
ROA –0.30 –0.31 –0.28 
 (–0.40) (–0.44) (–0.40) 
Return –0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (–0.09) (0.07) (0.10) 
Leverage 0.45 0.40 0.39 
 (0.99) (0.93) (0.91) 
Risk –0.18*** –0.14** –0.14** 
 (–2.65) (–2.10) (–2.14) 
BTM –0.10 –0.11 –0.10 
 (–0.71) (–0.87) (–0.78) 
Constant 0.78* 1.08*** 1.09*** 
 (1.88) (2.65) (2.71) 
    
AgeGroup dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 585 585 585 
Adj. R–squared 0.17 0.21 0.21 
 
Notes to Table 7: 
This table reports coefficient estimates and t–statistics (in parentheses) for OLS 
regression models estimating the relationships between Pension, Residual pay, the 
PostCrisis period, and GovScore, for CEOs. We estimate the following model:  
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
+ 𝛽5𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
+ ∑𝜷(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 
(4) 
PostCrisis dummy variable, coded 1 for years 2009–2011, and 0 for years 2004–2008. 
All other variables are as defined in Table 1. White t–statistics are based on 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors after clustering by firm; results are similar 
when clustering by both firm and year. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * < 0.10 
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Table 8: Foreign Exchange Listing, Product Market Competition, and CEO Pensions 
 
 (1) 
CEOs Only 
(2) 
CEOs Only 
(3) 
CEOs Only 
(4) 
CEOs Only 
Variables 
Pension/ 
Salary 
Pension/ 
Salary 
Pension/ 
Salary 
Pension/ 
Salary 
     
Bonus/Salary –0.10***    
 (–3.37)    
Equity/Salary –0.01    
 (–0.63)    
Residual pay/Salary  –0.02** –0.02** –0.04*** 
  (–2.39) (–2.48) (–3.90) 
GovScore   –0.11*** –0.10*** 
   (–3.21) (–2.95) 
PostCrisis    –0.20*** 
    (–2.82) 
Residual pay/Salary*PostCrisis    0.03** 
    (2.43) 
SalesShare 2.49*** 2.20*** 1.53** 1.51** 
 (3.16) (2.85) (2.03) (2.10) 
SEC 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.17 
 (1.20) (1.12) (1.07) (1.42) 
ROA –0.31 –0.38 –0.33 –0.46 
 (–0.43) (–0.54) (–0.49) (–0.68) 
Return –0.11 –0.13 –0.13 0.02 
 (–0.98) (–1.09) (–1.13) (0.16) 
Leverage 0.45 0.64 0.55 0.43 
 (1.04) (1.49) (1.33) (1.07) 
Risk –0.10* –0.14** –0.11* –0.12* 
 (–1.75) (–2.25) (–1.72) (–1.84) 
BTM –0.23* –0.15 –0.16 –0.14 
 (–1.80) (–1.10) (–1.16) (–1.06) 
Constant 0.87** 0.80** 1.07*** 0.99*** 
 (2.25) (2.13) (2.81) (2.62) 
     
AgeGroup dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 585 585 585 585 
Adj. R–squared 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.22 
 
Notes to Table 8: 
This table reports coefficient estimates and t–statistics (in parentheses) for OLS regression 
models estimating the relationship between Pension, Bonus, and Equity (Column 1), and Pension 
and Residual pay (Column 2), including the variables SalesShare and SEC in the model as 
robustness checks. We estimate versions of the following models: 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝜷(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 
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𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡
+ ∑𝜷(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 
 
SalesShare is defined as the ratio of a firm’s sales to aggregate industry sales in the same year 
and SEC is an indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the United States and 0 
otherwise. PostCrisis is a dummy variable, coded 1 for years 2009–2011, and 0 for years 2004–
2008. Column 3 includes GovScore and Column 4 includes PostCrisis and an interaction term 
Residual pay/Salary*PostCrisis. All other variables are as defined in Table 1. White t–statistics 
are based on heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors after clustering by firm; results are 
similar when clustering by both firm and year. 
***
 p < 0.01, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
*
 < 0.10 
 
 
 
 
